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Abstract
Although executive functions (e.g., response inhibition) are often thought to interact consciously with reward, recent
studies have demonstrated that they can also be triggered by unconscious stimuli. Further research has suggested a close
relationship between consciously and unconsciously triggered response inhibition. To date, however, the effect of reward
on unconsciously triggered response inhibition has not been explored. To address this issue, participants in this study
performed runs of a modified Go/No-Go task during which they were exposed to both high and low value monetary
rewards presented both supraliminally and subliminally. Participants were informed that they would earn the reward
displayed if they responded correctly to each trial of the run. According to the results, when rewards were presented
supraliminally, a greater unconsciously triggered response inhibition was observed for high-value rewards than for lowvalue rewards. In contrast, when rewards were presented subliminally, no enhanced unconsciously triggered response
inhibition was observed. Results revealed that supraliminal and subliminal rewards have distinct effects on unconsciously
triggered response inhibition. These findings have important implications for extending our understanding of the
relationship between reward and response inhibition.
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No-Go trials elongated ongoing task behavior compared with the
strongly masked Go trials, suggesting that unconsciously perceived
stimuli triggered response inhibition. The study further revealed
that unconsciously triggered response inhibition was strongly
associated with the pre-supplementary motor area and the inferior
frontal cortex, which relates to the same network employed in
conscious response inhibition [16]. Subsequent studies have
reported similar neural mechanisms for both consciously and
unconsciously triggered response inhibition [15,17,18] despite a
limited amount of research suggesting the presence of dissociable
mechanisms [19]. It seems plausible that there is a close
relationship between consciously and unconsciously triggered
response inhibition.
To our knowledge, comparably little research has investigated
whether reward can influence unconsciously triggered executive
functions (e.g., unconsciously triggered response inhibition). In the
present study, therefore, we attempted to examine this question
using a modified Go/No-Go task in combination with the rewardpriming paradigm [3]. In the reward-priming task, participants
were supraliminally or subliminally exposed to a low-value or
high-value reward they could earn by performing well on a
modified Go/No-Go task. Through this approach, we sought to

Introduction
A considerable amount of research has demonstrated that
people invest an increased amount of effort in tasks when rewards
are at stake, regardless of whether such rewards are consciously
perceived [1–3]. However, there is ongoing debate as to whether
supraliminal and subliminal reward information influence executive functions in similar ways. On one hand, several studies have
shown that both supraliminal and subliminal reward information
have similar effects on executive functions with high-value rewards
enhancing task performance [4–6]. On the other hand, numerous
recent studies have also concluded that supraliminal and
subliminal reward information have distinct effects on task
performance [7–10]. Specifically, supraliminal, not subliminal,
reward information can influence executive functions. Traditional
views hold that high-level cognitive control functions require
attention and consciousness [11,12]. Recent studies, however,
have shown that response inhibition, a key component of highlevel executive control functions, can be triggered unconsciously
[13–15]. For example, van Gaal and colleagues [17] instructed
participants to perform a modified Go/No-Go task that included
weakly masked No-Go trials, strongly masked No-Go trials, as well
as Go trials. Interestingly, results showed that the strongly masked
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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investigate how performance-contingent supraliminal and subliminal reward information influence unconsciously triggered response inhibition.
Building on previous studies exploring conscious (supraliminal)
and unconscious (subliminal) information processes [20–23], we
hypothesized that supraliminal and subliminal rewards would
influence unconsciously triggered response inhibition in distinct
ways. First, we hypothesized that participants would experience
greater unconsciously triggered response inhibition for supraliminal high-value rewards than for low-value rewards. Given that the
neural activation magnitude of an unconscious inhibition network
could predict the unconsciously initialed RT slowing (i.e. mean
RT of strongly masked No-Go trials minus strongly masked Go
trials; for review, see van Gaal et al. [17]) and correlated positively
with it, we hypothesized that participants would induce greater
unconsciously triggered response inhibition for supraliminal highvalue rewards, as shown by larger amount of RT slowing. Second,
we hypothesized that high-value rewards would not significantly
boost task performance when presented subliminally.

Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
The ethics committee of Southwest University of China
approved this experiment. Written informed consent was obtained
from all participants in compliance with the principles contained
in the Declaration of Helsinki.

Participants
A total of 35 undergraduates (20 women, 15 men; age range
= 19–24 years; mean age = 21.76, SD = 1.76) from Southwest
University in China participated in our study. All participants
were right-handed with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Upon completion of the trials, they received any money earned
during the experiment. Data from one participant were excluded
from the analysis due to an above-chance discrimination of the
primes.

Stimuli and procedure
Stimuli were displayed on a 20-inch Dell monitor (Dell, Inc.,
Round Rock, Texas) with a 60 Hz refresh rate. Participants
viewed the display from a distance of about 70 cm so that each
centimeter subtended a visual angle of 0.82u. The E-Prime
software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, PA) was
used for stimulus presentation and behavioral data collection.
Participants performed 48 runs during the experiment. At the
beginning of each run, a fixation cross appeared (2500 ms)
followed sequentially by a pre-mask (300 ms), the reward stimulus
(17 or 300 ms), a post-mask (300 ms), another fixation cross
(1500 ms, see Figure 1A), and a modified Go/No-Go task of 32
trials (see Figure 1B). Participants were informed that they would
receive the reward presented at the beginning of the run if they
responded correctly to each of the 32 trials. The cumulative
earnings attained were presented at the end of each run (see
Figure 1C). Participants were instructed that the reward stimuli
were either 1 cent or 1 yuan (approximately 100 cents) and that
sometimes they would be difficult to perceive.
The modified Go/No-Go task was adapted from van Gaal et al.
[17] and consisted of 32 trials made up of eight of each of the four
trial types (weakly masked Go trials, weakly masked No-Go trials,
strongly masked Go trials, and strongly masked No-Go trials). For
the weakly masked conditions, a fixation point (500 ms) appeared,
followed by a Go or No-Go prime for a relatively long duration
(233 ms) and a briefly presented annulus (17 ms). In the strongly
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Figure 1. Experimental design. Participants were informed that, if
they responded correctly to each of the 32 trials in a Go/No-Go task (B),
they would receive the reward that was displayed at the beginning of
the run (A). Participants were instructed that cumulative earnings would
appear at the end of each run (C). Each run included 16 weakly masked
trials and 16 strongly masked trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108530.g001

masked conditions, the presentation duration of prime and
annulus were 17 ms and 233 ms, respectively. The purpose of
the strongly masked condition in the experimental design was to
ensure that the annulus acted as a metacontrast mask, since this
works effectively in reducing stimulus visibility [24]. Thus, in the
strongly masked condition, participants were incapable of
perceiving the Go or No-Go signals and just perceived a white
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subjects factors. Only correct responses in which a reward could
be earned were analyzed. RTs less than 100 or greater than 1000
were excluded from the analysis [16]. Mean RTs were entered
into a 26262 repeated measures ANOVA with reward value (1
cent and 1 yuan), reward presentation duration (17 ms and
300 ms), and trial type (strongly masked Go trial and strongly
masked No-Go trial) as within-subjects factors. RT slowing was
analyzed in a 262 repeated measures ANOVA with reward value
(1 cent and 1 yuan) and reward presentation duration (17 ms and
300 ms) as within-subjects factors. Detection performance (percentage correct) was tested for each participant using a binominal
test (p,.05). At the group level, a one-sample t test was performed
on the d scores (test against zero).

annulus. Duration was equal for all trials (750 ms), and all trials
were presented in random order. The between-trial interval was
1000–1500 ms.
Participants were instructed to respond to a white annulus
(visual angle of 0.8u) as quickly as possible by pressing the ‘‘m’’ key
on a standard keyboard with their right index finger but to
withhold their response when a white square (visual angle of
0.47u60.47u) preceded the annulus. However, participants were
instructed to respond to a white diamond (the same square
revolved by 45u) preceding the annulus as quickly as possible by
pressing the ‘‘m’’ key with their right index finger in a standard
keyboard. The No-Go signal stimulus (diamond or square) was
counterbalanced among participants.
To detect whether the modified Go/No-Go task induced
unconsciously triggered response inhibition, 21 participants first
performed the task in a pilot study, and the data of the strongly
masked Go and No-Go trials were analyzed. The results of this
pilot demonstrated that participants showed slower response when
responding to the strongly masked No-Go trials (M = 389.75 ms,
SD = 44.33) than in the strongly masked Go trials (M = 382.78 ms,
SD = 43.53; t[20] = 2.92, p = .008), indicating that unconsciously
triggered response inhibition occurred during the modified Go/
No-Go task. A two-choice discrimination test suggested that the
primes (diamond and square) could not be perceived under the
strongly masked conditions (mean percentage correct = 49.6%,
SD = 0.03; d9 = 0.15, SD = 0.43, t[20] = 1.55, p = .14).
Each participant completed a training run before performing
the formal 48-run experiment. After completion of the last run,
each participant underwent two tests aimed at detecting whether
he or she could perceive the reward and prime stimuli that were
presented subliminally. First, subjects completed a forced-choice
test focused on the reward stimuli. Each trial consisted of a reward
stimulus and two mask stimuli identical to those in the main
experiment, followed by four choices on a black screen instead of
the Go/No-Go task. Participants were asked to press the ‘‘1’’ key if
they were sure that they saw ‘‘1 cent,’’ the ‘‘2’’ key if they were
sure that they saw ‘‘1 yuan,’’ the ‘‘3’’ key if they thought they had
probably seen ‘‘1 cent,’’ and the ‘‘4’’ key if they thought they had
probably see ‘‘1 yuan.’’ The test was comprised of 96 trials that
included 24 trials of each of the four reward conditions
(supraliminally presented 1 cent, supraliminally presented 1 yuan,
subliminally presented 1 cent, and subliminally presented 1 yuan).
In this task, the importance of accuracy rather than speed was
emphasized to the participants. The choices remained on the
screen until the participants made a response.
The second test assessed whether participants could discriminate between the strongly masked No-Go trials and the strongly
masked Go trials in a two-alternative forced-choice test. In this
test, participants performed four blocks of 32 trials (16 trials of
each strongly masked condition) with the same stimuli and
procedure as was used for the main experiment. A choice-selection
screen followed each trial. Participants were instructed that they
should press the ‘‘v’’ key if they saw the No-Go signal (the
diamond) and the ‘‘n’’ key if they saw the Go signal (the square).
Before performing this test, participants were told that diamonds
and squares would be presented with equal frequency. The
importance of accuracy over speed was similarly emphasized in
this task. The choices remained on the screen until the participants
selected a response.

Results
Reward and prime visibility test
In the forced-choice test measuring monetary reward visibility,
participants perceived 98.9% (SD = 0.02) of rewards when
presented supraliminally, indicating that participants could perceive the value of the reward. All of the participants reported that
they could not consciously perceive the subliminally presented
rewards, and the mean percentages of correct responses did not
differ significantly from chance level (mean percentage of correct
responses = 50.86%, SD = 0.08, p = .54). Furthermore, d scores
did not differ significantly from zero (d9 = 0.05, SD = 1.87, t[33]
= 0.16, p = .87). These results indicate that participants could
perceive rewards when presented supraliminally but not when
presented subliminally.
In the two-alternative forced-choice test that measured Go and
No-Go prime visibility, all of the participants reported that they
could not consciously perceive the strongly masked signals, the
mean percentage of correct responses did not differ significantly
from chance level (mean percentage of correct responses = 49.7%,
SD = 0.07, p = .82), and d scores did not differ significantly from
zero (d9 = 0.08, SD = 1.37, t[33] = 0.34, p = .73). These results
showed that participants could not perceive the Go and No-Go
prime in the strongly masked condition.

Percentage of correct runs
Analysis of the percentage of correct runs indicated a significant
main effect of reward value (F[1, 33] = 22.78, p,.001) interacting
with reward presentation duration (F[1, 33] = 23.33, p,.001).
Further analysis revealed that, when the rewards were presented
supraliminally, participants had a higher percentage of correct
runs when they had the possibility of earning the high-value
rewards (M = 90.81%, SD = 0.12) compared to the low-value
rewards (M = 64.09%, SD = 0.30; F[1, 33] = 29.98, p,.001). This
implies that being conscious of the potential of a high-value reward
instigated greater effort among the participants than did the lowvalue rewards. This effect was not observed, however, when
rewards were presented subliminally (1 yuan, M = 80.88%,
SD = 0.17; 1 cent, M = 79.41%, SD = 0.16; F,1; see Figure 2).
No other effect was observed within the percentage of correct runs.

Reaction times
ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of trial type (F[1, 33]
= 109.73, p,.001) with faster responses recorded for the strongly
masked Go trials (M = 390.86 ms, SD = 49.15) than for the No-Go
trials (M = 404.79 ms, SD = 47.74). This finding was consistent
with previous findings indicating that unconsciously triggered
response inhibition existed under reward conditions.
Further analysis of RTs showed that reward value had a
significant main effect (F[1, 33] = 18.56, p = .002), which

Data analysis
The percentage of correct runs was analyzed with a 262
repeated measures ANOVA with reward value (1 cent and 1 yuan)
and reward presentation duration (17 ms and 300 ms) as withinPLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Reaction time slowing
Importantly, analysis of RT slowing revealed that reward values
significantly interacted with reward presentation duration (F[1,33]
= 6.19, p = .018). Follow-up analysis showed that RT slowing for
high-value rewards (M = 16.47 ms, SD = 9.63) was significantly
more than for low-value rewards (M = 10.22 ms, SD = 14.15)
when rewards were presented supraliminally (F[1,33] = 5.58,
p = .024). These findings suggest that being conscious of high-value
rewards enhanced unconsciously triggered response inhibition.
However, no effect was observed of high-value rewards on
improved task performance when rewards were presented
subliminally (1 yuan, M = 13.94 ms, SD = 8.85; 1 cent,
M = 15.09 ms, SD = 11.00; F,1; see Figure 4). No other effect
was observed for RT slowing.

Discussion
In this study, we combined the reward-priming paradigm and a
modified Go/No-Go task to investigate the effects of supraliminal
and subliminal reward information on unconsciously triggered
response inhibition. Results showed that participants induced
greater unconsciously triggered response inhibition for high-value
rewards than for low-value rewards when presented supraliminally. This may suggest that being conscious of the notion of
supraliminal high-value rewards enhances unconsciously triggered
response inhibition. However, this enhanced performance was not
observed when rewards were presented subliminally, lending
support to the notion that supraliminal and subliminal rewards
have distinct effects on the unconscious information process.
Participants increased unconsciously triggered response inhibition for high-value rewards when presented supraliminally, which
is consistent with previous research suggesting that supraliminal
(conscious) high-value rewards can enhance executive functions
[7,8]. These findings could be interpreted in three ways. First,
previous studies have demonstrated that being conscious of highvalue reward enables individuals to increase their effort and level
of engagement in cognitive tasks, resulting in better performance.
In this study, participants were shown to employ more effort for
supraliminal high-value rewards, as reflected by higher percentage
of correct runs. Second, our findings are in line with the theory
that conscious awareness of rewards enables participants to
employ strategic behavior [9] on attainment of high-value rewards
and to actively prevent the waste of mental resources on
attainment of low-value rewards. Third, our findings may also
be interpreted in terms of the neural mechanisms that underlie the
processing of supraliminal reward information and unconsciously
triggered response inhibition. Several studies have revealed that
the prefrontal cortical network plays a crucial role in relation to
supraliminal rewards information [25–27]. Interestingly, prior
work has demonstrated that the mechanisms associated with
unconsciously triggered response inhibition are located mainly in
the prefrontal cortical network [16]. We speculate, therefore, that,
when a participant is consciously aware of high-value rewards, his
or her prefrontal cortex is more active in the process, resulting in
greater unconsciously triggered response inhibition.
However, this effect was not observed when rewards were
presented subliminally. In the forced-choice test on reward
visibility, we observed that participants could not distinguish the
value of coins when presented subliminally, suggesting that
participants could not perceive the value of subliminally presented
rewards. Further, in this study, participants were not shown to
recruit strategies to attain a higher percentage of correct runs for
subliminal high-value rewards, suggesting that participants might
not employ more effort for subliminal high-value rewards. We

Figure 2. The percentage of correct runs as a function of
reward value and reward presentation duration. High rewards
and low rewards have no significant difference in effect on percentage
of correct run when presented subliminally (left panel). High rewards
elicited higher percentage of correct runs than low rewards when
presented supraliminally (right panel). Error bars represent standard
errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108530.g002

interacted with reward presentation duration (F[1, 33] = 26.95,
p,.001). Participants also recorded a slower response when given
the opportunity to earn 1 yuan (M = 334.82 ms, SD = 48.92)
compared with 1 cent (M = 321.22 ms, SD = 50.02) in the
supraliminal conditions (F[1,33] = 29.33, p,.001) but not in the
subliminal conditions (1 yuan, M = 328.78 ms, SD = 47.85; 1 cent,
M = 333.84 ms, SD = 48.84; F,1). These findings suggest that
participants slowed their responses when conscious of the potential
of earning high-value rewards.
Importantly, we found an interaction effect among the three
experimental factors (F[1, 33] = 6.19, p = .018). To interpret this
three-way interaction, we conducted a 2 (reward value) 62 (trial
type) repeated measures ANOVA separately for the two reward
presentation durations (subliminal and supraliminal conditions). In
the subliminal condition (reward duration = 17 ms), only trial type
had a significant main effect (F[1, 33] = 105.98, p,.001) in which
participants responded faster for strongly masked Go trials
(M = 390.56 ms,
SD = 48.75)
than
for
No-Go
trials
(M = 405.08 ms, SD = 47.82; see Figure 3A). Under supraliminal
conditions (reward duration = 300 ms), both reward value
(F[1,33] = 29.33, p,.001) and trial type (F[1,33] = 69.65, p,
.001) had significant main effects, and the interaction between
reward value and trial type was also significant (F[1, 33] = 5.58,
p = .024; see Figure 3B). Further analysis revealed that strongly
masked Go trials resulted in slower responses for 1 yuan
(M = 397.60 ms, SD = 49.87) than for 1 cent (M = 384.71 ms,
SD = 51.96; F[1,33] = 13.48, p = .001) and that slower responses
were also found for strongly masked No-Go trials with high-value
rewards (M = 414.08 ms, SD = 48.44) than for those with lowvalue rewards (M = 394.92 ms, SD = 49.04; F[1, 33] = 42.27, p,
.001). No other effect was observed for RTs.
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Figure 3. Mean RTs of trial type as a function of reward value and reward presentation duration. (A) High rewards and low rewards have
no significant difference in effect on either mean RT of strongly masked Go trials or mean RT of strongly masked No-Go trials when presented
subliminally. (B) High rewards elicited slower mean RT both on strongly masked Go trials and on strongly masked No-Go trials than did low rewards
when presented supraliminally. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108530.g003

speculate, therefore, that subliminal high-value rewards might
disable recruit strategies to invest more effort in processing the task
performance, resulting in the lack of reward effect. In line with

previous theoretical frameworks [20,28], our findings revealed
that, in the complex modified Go/No-Go task, subliminal reward
processing is limited when attempting to recruit strategies to
enhance task performance.
Similar to previous studies [7–9], our study confirmed that
supraliminal and subliminal rewards have distinct effects on
executive functions. These findings converged well with the
framework provided by Bijleveld et al. [5], which separates
reward processing into two stages: initial (unconscious/subliminal)
and full (conscious/supraliminal) reward processing. Full reward
processing is required in order for the brain to develop strategies to
affect behavior. This processing type may involve higher-level
cognitive functions located in the prefrontal cortex that are related
to unconscious inhibition control [13,16]. In contrast, the initial
reward processing that underlies executive functions is accompanied by activity in rudimentary brain structures (e.g., the ventral
striatum) that rarely correlate with unconscious inhibition control
[3,16,29]. This would explain why supraliminal reward processing
could influence task performance when subliminal reward
processing could not.
The present findings have both theoretical and practical
implications. They expand our understanding of the relationship
between reward and executive function as it has been demonstrated that conscious rewards can influence not only consciously
but also unconsciously triggered executive function. Additionally,
several studies have used enhanced (un)conscious response
inhibition to change habitual behavior that may be detrimental
to health, such as alcohol abuse [30,31]. As our findings suggest
that supraliminal reward information can improve unconscious
response inhibition, this may provide an effective method to
benefit individuals who abuse alcohol.
Several limitations of the present study should be noted. One
limitation is that our study did not consider influence of
personality. Bustin and colleagues suggested that personality

Figure 4. RT slowing as a function of reward value and reward
presentation duration. High rewards and low rewards have no
significant difference in effect on RT slowing when presented
subliminally (left panel). High rewards elicited larger amount of RT
slowing than low rewards when presented supraliminally (right panel).
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108530.g004
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Table S2 Date of the percentage of correct runs in the
formal experiment.
(DOC)

(e.g., novelty seeking) can affect the impact of rewards on executive
function [32]. Future research should take this factor into
consideration. Second, we did not consider the impact of intrinsic
motivation (e.g., interest) in this experiment. Although we
successfully induced participants’ extrinsic motivation through
monetary reward incentives, we cannot completely rule out the
effect of intrinsic motivation on task performance. Future research
should attempt to replicate the present findings while controlling
for the impact of intrinsic motivation.
In conclusion, the present study first revealed that supraliminal
high-value rewards could enhance unconsciously triggered response inhibition when subliminal high-value reward could not.
Our findings, therefore, lend support to the notion that
supraliminal and subliminal rewards have distinct effects on
unconsciously triggered response inhibition. Our findings provide
insight into the relationship between reward and response
inhibition.

Table S3 Mean Reaction time and RT slowing in the
formal experiment.
(DOC)
Table S4 Data of reward and prime visibility in the
formal experiment.
(DOC)
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